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 Andreas R. Ziegler / Yves Bonzon, April 2007 
  
How to reform WTO decision-making? An Analysis of the Current 
Functioning of the Organization from the Perspectives of Efficiency 
and Legitimacy 
  
  
This paper describes a close analysis of the functioning of WTO decision-making 
intended to provide a better view on the various reform proposals put forward in 
recent years. After explaining that these proposals are meant to enhance either the 
efficiency or the legitimacy of decision-making, we consider separately what we 
identify as the three components of decision-making: the object, the organ and the 
procedural mode. We first enumerate WTO powers and define the characteristics of 
the legitimacy requirements that result from the nature of these powers, pursuant to 
the idea of a varying legitimacy requirement. Then we take a close look at the WTO 
procedural modes and the composition of its organs, and assess to what extent the 
features of these two components fulfill the legitimacy requirements discussed earlier. 
We then examine some reform proposals and their potential impact on the efficiency 
and the legitimacy of WTO decision-making, arguing that a balance must be struck 
between the two imperatives since they can sometimes collide. We conclude that the 
scope for reforming the WTO organs and procedural modes is limited and that 
combining the three components of decision-making in a manner that would fulfill 
legitimacy requirements may imply making some corrections on the object of 
decision-making; which would mean limiting WTO powers.  
  
  
Introduction 
  
Most discussions about decision-making in the WTO currently revolve around the 
issues of legitimacy and efficiency. The issue of legitimacy is linked with the 
extending powers of the WTO, and is often related to the issue of state sovereignty. 
Indeed, in line with the growing international cooperation among states, the WTO is 
being allocated a number of powers that were traditionally the realm of the nation 
state, leading some scholars to raise the issue of the state’s loss of sovereignty as a 
consequence of this transfer of powers.1 In addition, the issue of legitimacy relates to 
the impact that WTO decision-making has on individuals — referred to as democratic 
legitimacy.2  
 Pursuant to the imperatives of both notions of legitimacy, the scope of 
this transfer of powers to the WTO as well as the evolution of the type of powers 
transferred should have an impact on the design of WTO decision-making procedures; 
indeed, the modalities of these procedures that legitimize the output of decision-
                                                
1 See: The Sutherland Report (2005), Chapter 3, which addresses the issue of sovereignty, 
linking it briefly with the issue of legitimacy (the report is labeled The Future of the WTO: 
Addressing Institutional Challenges in the New Millennium, and is to be found at: 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/10anniv_e/future_wto_e.htm).  
2 State sovereignty and democratic legitimacy are two distinct issues; however, they can in 
some cases be treated jointly, from a single perspective. 
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making (this being a prerequisite of compliance3) have to adapt to the type of powers 
exercised (according to the idea of a varying legitimacy requirement)4.  
  Previous contributions addressing the issue of legitimacy in WTO 
decision-making include the debate on WTO constitutionalization;5 in this context, 
some authors have argued that the WTO rules cannot serve a constitutional function 
in part because of the deficiencies of WTO decision-making procedures with respect 
to legitimacy. In addition, some scholars who have been calling for more transparency 
and participation in WTO decision-making, in the form of NGOs or parliamentary 
participation, have highlighted in their work the weakness of WTO procedures with 
respect to legitimacy. 6  
  In this paper, we make our own assessment of this issue by dissecting 
the WTO decision-making process and distinguishing what we will call its three 
components; indeed, like any other decision-making process, WTO decision-making 
is a combination of three parameters that we identify as the object (nature or type of 
power), the organ and the procedural mode. 
  Since the design of the organ and the procedural mode is a function of 
the type of power exercised (idea of varying legitimacy requirement), our first step is 
to define WTO powers. In the second and third steps, we take a look at the 
composition of WTO organs and at the procedural modes through which they operate, 
to allow us to determine to what extent the combination of the three elements in the 
WTO setting fulfill legitimacy requirements. 
  Efficiency (or operative efficiency) is the second general issue that is 
raised in connection with WTO decision-making. Since the Ministerial Conference in 
Seattle in 1999, many authors have expressed concern that WTO decision-making, in 
particular because of its consensual procedural mode, is no longer functioning 
properly, and that paralysis is threatening the organization.7 The cumbersome 
functioning of the WTO, or the paralysis of its policy-making function, can have 
various consequences. First is the risk that some players will turn to other forums, 
therefore threatening the very existence of the multilateral trading system;8 second, 
                                                
3 On the connection between legitimacy and compliance in general, see FRANCK T. M. 
(1988), “Legitimacy in the International System”, 82 AJIL 705-759. 
4 We concentrate here on the so-called input legitimacy, or procedural legitimacy; on the 
multiple facets of the concept of legitimacy, see ELSIG M. (2006), The World Trade 
Organization's Legitimacy Crisis: What Does the Beast Look Like?, forthcoming Journal of 
World Trade 41-1. 
5 See: KRAJEWSKI M. (2001), “Democratic Legitimacy and Constitutional Perspectives of 
WTO”, 35 JWT 167-186; HOWSE/NICOLAIDIS, “Legitimacy and Global Governance: Why 
Constitutionalizing the WTO is a Step too Far”, in: Porter R. et al. (eds.), Efficiency Equity 
and Legitimacy: The Multilateral Trading System at the Millennium, 227-263. 
6 Again, the Sutherland Report addresses the issue of broader participation in WTO decision-
making procedures, but without explicitly linking it with the nature of WTO powers. On the 
issue of broader participation: ESTY D. C. (2002), “The World Trade Organization’s 
Legitimacy Crisis”, World Trade Review, 1: 1, 7-22, CHARNOWITZ S. (2005), “WTO and 
Cosmopolitics”, JIEL / (3), 675-682. 
7 On the evolution of the WTO regime and the Seattle Ministerial Conference as a turning 
point, see KEOHANE R. /NYE J. (2001), “The Club Model of Multilateral Cooperation and 
Problems of Democratic Legitimacy”, in: Porter R. et al. (eds.), Efficiency Equity and 
Legitimacy: The Multilateral Trading System at the Millennium. 
8 In chapter 5, the Sutherland Report looks at the mechanisms of negotiations and decision-
making in order to consider whether structures and procedures are optimally designed, 
focusing on the consensus rule. Thus it is addressing the efficiency issue, and further links it 
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this paralysis can cause an imbalance of powers between the political and the judicial 
branch of the WTO, affecting the legitimacy of the latter’s outcomes.9   
 Using the approach consisting in distinguishing the three parameters of 
decision-making, we address in the second part of this work the various propositions 
for reform that have been made by scholars with respect to legitimacy and efficiency, 
and explain how both issues are closely intertwined. 
  
  
1.  The three parameters of decision-making 
  
1.1.  The object of decision-making 
  
In the debate on consensus and efficiency in the WTO, one relevant proposal that has 
been made by several authors is to define a typology of WTO decisions in order to 
submit these decisions to varying procedural modes. Behind this proposition lies the 
idea that various degrees of legitimacy requirements exist with respect to various 
types of decisions. This attempt of defining the object of WTO decision-making is 
therefore directly connected to the issue of legitimacy10.  
  Some suggest a rather vague distinction between decisions on 
procedural aspects and more substantial decisions.11 A slightly more detailed 
proposition is to separate housekeeping decisions, which would cover the internal 
matters of the organization, as well as day-to-day decisions that would relate to the 
application and interpretation of existing rules, from decisions by which new rules are 
created.12 A further distinction could be made between decisions that affect the rights 
and obligations of Members and those with no such effect, as referred to in the 
amending clause of Article X WTO Agreement. 
 
With a view to define different legitimacy requirements in WTO decision-
making, we first refer to Article III of the WTO Agreement to draw up a typology of 
                                                                                                                                      
with member’s political considerations (“political impetus”), spelling out all the external 
parameters that have a bearing on the process (p. 61-62). 
9 See COTTIER T./TAKENOSHITA S. (2003), “The Balance of Power in WTO Decision-
Making: Towards Weighted Voting in Legislative Response”, in: Aussenwirtschaft, 58, 171-
214.; VON BOGDANDY A. (2001), “Law and Politics in the WTO – Strategies to Cope with 
a Deficient Relationship”, in: Max Planck Yearbook of International Law, Vol. 5, 609-674. 
10 We must recall here that issues of legitimacy can be considered through two different 
perspectives. The first perspective regards the impact of the WTO on the sovereignty of states 
and informs legitimacy requirements pursuant to the theory of international law (international 
perspective); the second perspective is the impact on the individual and has to do with 
legitimacy requirements in the national law-making sense, that is democratic legitimacy 
(national perspective). However both kind of legitimacy are often closely intertwined since 
powers that states transfer to the WTO will often be of a kind that has direct impact on 
individuals. 
11 See The Sutherland Report, p. 64, as well as JACKSON J. H. (2001), “The WTO 
‘Constitution’ and Proposed Reforms: Seven Mantras Revisited’, JIEL 67-78, the latter 
mentioning the amending clause (Article X WTO Agreement) as a possible model. 
12 In: VAN DEN BOSSCHE P./ALEXOVICOVA I. (2005), “Effective Global Economic 
Governance by the World Trade Organization”, 8 JIEL, 667-690. 
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WTO decisions. This article seems to establish a first general distinction between the 
executive,13 legislative14 and judiciary15 functions of the organization.16   
Our challenge here is to identify WTO decisions that are of a legislative type, 
as distinct from those that would be of a rather executive type.17  
First we focus on the legal texts and make a formal enumeration of those 
WTO decision-making powers that could be either considered as legislative or 
executive; then we make a material assessment of the impact of WTO decisions in 
order to further characterize these powers. 
     
  
1.1.1. The legal basis of WTO powers 
   
1.1.1.1.  Power allocation based on the disposition about the 
institutional setting (Article IV of the WTO Agreement) 
  
Article IV on the institutional structure of the organization allocates some general 
powers to the organs it is establishing. The Ministerial Conference, which is the 
highest body in the hierarchy, “shall carry out the functions of the WTO and take 
actions necessary to this effect (…), having the authority to take decisions on all 
matters under any of the Multilateral Trade Agreement”. 
 On the second level, the General Council shall conduct the functions of the 
Ministerial Conference in the intervals between its meetings. Furthermore, it has 
general guidance over the third-level councils (one example of which is the approval 
of their rules of procedure), and can assign functions to them not provided for by the 
agreements.   
                                                
13 Paragraph I: “The WTO shall facilitate the implementation, administration and operation, 
and further the objectives, of this Agreement and of the Multilateral Trade Agreements, and 
shall also provide the framework for the implementation, administration and operation of the 
Plurilateral Trade Agreements”. 
14Paragraph 2:  “The WTO shall provide the forum for negotiations among Members 
concerning their multilateral trade relations in matters dealt with under the agreements in the 
Annexes to this Agreement. The WTO may also provide a forum for further negotiations 
among its Members concerning their multilateral relations, and a framework for the 
implementation of the results of such negotiations, as may be decided by the Ministerial 
Conference”.   
15Paragraph 3: “The WTO shall administer the Understanding on Rules and Procedures 
Governing the Settlement of Disputes (…) in Annex 2 of this Agreement”. 
16 Some authors at least are interpreting this disposition as an analogy of the three 
constitutional powers of states (see FOOTER M. E. (2005), An Institutional and Normative 
Analysis of the World Trade Organization, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, pp. 25 f., VON 
BOGDANDY (2001), who both express some reservations on this view). 
17In so doing, we re being inspired by national constitutional theory that uses material criteria 
to define those state’s acts that require parliamentary adoption, pursuant to the material aspect 
of the principle of the rule of law. This material aspect requires that some decisions must be 
adopted through a democratic procedure because of the impact they have on the individuals. 
In Swiss constitutional theory, this impact is abstractly defined using the criterion of 
importance (see Art. 164 of the Federal Constitution), which is further concretized by various 
criteria (see: AUBERT J.-F. / MAHON P. (2003), Petit commentaire de la Constitution 
fédérale de la Confédération suisse du 18 avril 1999, ad Art. 164 ;, nos 191-196, p. 112-114). 
This issue is of relevance when the Parliament is delegating some of its decision-making 
power to the executive. 
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 On the third level, the Council for Trade in Goods (CTG), the Council for 
Trade in Services (GATS Council) and the Council for Trade Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property (TRIPS Council) oversee the functioning of their respective 
agreements. Also on this third level, the Ministerial Conference may establish some 
additional committees (Committee on Trade and Development, Committee on 
Balance-of-Payments Restrictions, Committee on Budget, Finance and 
Administration). These committees shall carry out the functions assigned to them by 
the agreements and the General Council. They may also establish additional 
committees with such functions as they deem appropriate.18  
 On the fourth level are the subsidiary bodies established by the three third-
level Councils. 
  
1.1.1.2.  Power allocation based on the disposition about decision-
making (Article IX of the WTO Agreement) 
  
Article X, which covers decision-making, refers to particular kinds of decisions. The 
Ministerial Conference or the General Council should adopt authoritative 
interpretations of the agreements on the basis of a recommendation by one of the 
third-level Councils when one of the agreements they oversee is under consideration 
(paragraph 2). Waivers of an obligation in the agreements may be decided by the 
Ministerial Conference, on the basis of a report produced by one of the third-level 
Councils when the agreement they oversee is at issue (paragraph 3). 
  Then, according to Article X, the Ministerial Conference may decide 
to submit an amendment (which can be proposed by a Member or one of the third-
level Councils when one of the agreements they oversee is under discussion) to the 
Members for acceptance. In some cases, the Ministerial Conference may approve 
amendments without submitting them to the Members for acceptance (paragraphs 6 
and 7). 
  
  
1.1.2.  Attributions of power in the side Agreements 
  
The agreements of Annex 1 to the WTO Agreement set up a number of bodies and 
attribute powers to them. Here we try to characterize these powers and point out the 
recurrent features contained in these agreements. 
  
1.1.2.1.  In general 
  
Generally, many bodies are given the functions of “allowing Members to consult on 
any matters relating to the operation of the Agreement or the furtherance of its 
objectives, and shall carry out such responsibilities as assigned to it under this 
Agreement or by the Members” and shall “establish working parties as may be 
appropriate, which shall carry out such responsibilities assigned to them by the 
Committee in accordance with relevant provisions of the Agreement”. 
                                                
18 Specifically, the Committee on Trade and Development “shall periodically review the 
special provisions in the Multilateral Trade Agreements in favour of least-developed country 
Members and report to the General Council for appropriate action” (Article IV par. 7 WTO 
Agreement). 
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 The following bodies have been given such tasks: the TBT Committee on 
Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT Committee),19 the CTG in the context of Trade-
Related Investment measures (TRIMs),20 the Committee on Anti-Dumping Practice,21 
the Committee on Customs Valuation,22 the Committee on Rules of Origin,23 the 
Committee on Import Licensing,24 the Committee on Safeguard,25 the Committee on 
Subsidies and Countervailing measures,26 the GATS Council,27 and the TRIPS 
Council.28  
  Some of these bodies may grant special and differential treatment to 
developing country members, such as the Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
Measures (SPS Committee),29 the TBT Committee,30 the CTG in the context of 
TRIMs,31 the GATS Council32 or the TRIPS Council.33  
  Some bodies shall review the functioning of their Agreement and 
submit proposals for amendments to higher bodies, such as the SPS Committee,34 
TBT Committee,35 the Committee on TRIMs,36 the Committee on Rules of Origin,37 
and the Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures.38 
  
1.1.2.2.  Review function 
  
Some bodies established by the agreements are charged with reviewing the adequacy 
of information submitted by the Members.39  Some other bodies are responsible for 
reviewing measures taken by the Members and report to higher bodies with proposals 
for recommendations, such as the Committee on Balance-of-Payment Restrictions,40 
                                                
19 Art. 13 of the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT Agreement). 
20 Art. 7 of the Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures: a Committee on TRIM 
that shall carry out responsibilities assigned to it by the CTG, afford members consultation 
opportunities and monitor the operation and implementation of Agreement, for report to CTG. 
21 Art. 16 of the Agreement on Implementation of Art. VI of GATT 1994. 
22 Art. 18 of the Agreement on Implementation of Art. VII of GATT 1994. 
23 Art. 4 Agreement on Rules on Origin. 
24 Art. 4 Agreement on Import Licensing Procedures. 
25 Art. 13 Agreement on Safeguards. 
26 Art. 24 Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures. 
27 Art. XXIV GATS. See also : Ministerial Decision on Institutional Arrangements for the 
GATS. 
28 Art. 68 TRIPS. 
29 Art. 10 SPS Agreement. 
30 Art. 12.8 of the TBT Agreement. 
31 According to Art. 5 of the TRIMs Agreement, the CTG may extend the transition period for 
the elimination of notified TRIMs for developing country Members. 
32 Art. 66 GATS: the GATS Council may extend the 10-year waiver granted to least-
developed countries. 
33 Art. 66 TRIPS. 
34 Art. 12 para. 7 SPS Agreement. 
35 Art. 15 TBT Agreement. 
36 Art. 7 para.. 3 TRIM Agreement. 
37 Art. 6 para.. 2 of the Agreement on Rules of Origin. 
38 Art. 32.7 Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures. 
39 See, on notification review of state-trading enterprises, the Working Party established by 
paragraph 5 of the Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XVII of the GATT 1994. 
40 Paragraphs 5 and 13 of the Understanding on the Balance-of-Payments Provisions (BOP) of 
the GATT 1994. The Committee shall carry out consultations in order to review all restrictive 
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the CTG in the context of safeguards measures,41 the Committee on Safeguards,42 the 
Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures,43 and the GATS Council.44 
Likewise, a working party shall examine notifications of the decisions to enter a 
customs union or free-trade area (and report to the CTG).45  
 Other bodies have the task of reviewing the progress made in the 
implementation of commitments made by the Members (Committee on 
Agriculture).46 
  
1.1.2.3.  Concretization function 
  
Some bodies shall concretize notions contained in the Agreements, like such as the 
CTG regarding the criteria of “parties primarily concerned” or that have a “substantial 
interest”, in the context of the modification of schedules.47 
 
1.1.2.4. Forum function 
  
Some bodies serve as a forum for consultations between Members, carrying out the 
functions necessary to implement provisions of the relevant agreements with respect 
to harmonization, such as the SPS Committee,48 the Committee on Rules of Origin,49 
and the GATS Council.50 
                                                                                                                                      
measures taken for BOP purposes and report to the General Council with proposals for 
recommendations aimed at promoting implementation of Article XII GATT.  
41 Art. 13 Agreement on Safeguards: the Committee on Safeguards shall examine, upon 
request, whether the procedural requirements of the Agreement have been complied with in 
connection with a safeguard measure (13.1.b), and to review whether proposals to suspend 
concessions are “substantially equivalent” and report to the CTG. 
42 Art. 8 para. 2 Agreement on Safeguards: the CTG can disapprove of the suspension by a 
Member of concessions under the GATT to the trade of another Member applying a safeguard 
measure for which no agreed compensation has been found. 
43 Art. 8.4 Agreement on Subsidies on Countervailing Measures. The Committee should 
review notifications about subsidies and determine whether or not the conditions and criteria 
laid down in paragraph 2 have been met. Art. 9.4: the Committee shall determine if an 
adverse effect exists (pursuant to Art. 9.1), and recommend to the subsidizing Member to 
modify his programme or authorize the requesting Member to take countermeasures. Art. 
27.4: the Committee determines whether an extension of the eight-year period for phasing out 
export subsidies is justified. Art. 29.4: the Committee can give Members in the process of 
transformation departures from their notified programs, measures and time frames.  
44 Art. V GATS: the GATS Council may establish working parties to examine agreements on 
economic integration between the Members. Based on these reports, the Council makes 
recommendations to the Members on the implementation of any of these agreements (para. 
1). 
45 Paragraph 7 of the Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XXIV of GATT 1994. 
46 Art. 18 of the Agreement on Agriculture. 
47 Paragraph 1 of the Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XXVIII of GATT 1994. 
48 Art. 12 SPS Agreement: the SPS Committee shall develop a procedure to monitor the 
process of international harmonization and use of international standards. In conjunction with 
relevant international organizations, it should “establish a list of international standards, 
guidelines or recommendations relating to SPS measures which the Committee determines to 
have a major trade impact” (paragraph 2). 
49 Art. 6 para. 3 and Article 9 Agreement on Rules of Origin. 
50 Art. VI para. 4 GATS: the GATS Council shall develop any appropriate disciplines, 
through appropriate bodies it may establish, with a view that measures relating to 
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 Others, such as the GATS Council, have the same task in the context of 
progressive liberalization.51 
 
1.1.2.5. Interpretation function 
  
Some bodies are responsible for ensuring, at a technical level, uniformity in the 
interpretation and application of their agreement, for example, the Technical 
Committee on Customs Valuation,52 Technical Committee on Rules of Origin,53 and 
the Permanent Group of Experts in the context of subsidies.54  
  
  
1.1.3.  The impact of WTO decisions 
  
 Some of the powers allocated to the WTO organs, as enumerated above, have 
the potential to exercise such an impact on the individual that it could be assimilated 
to a legislative kind of power. This is the case with respect to the power of the 
Ministerial Conference and General Council to adopt legally binding decisions in the 
form of primary rule-making or secondary rule-making. Also, we see that some lower 
bodies can develop rules on the basis of their forum function with respect to 
harmonization.  
 On the other hand, functions of WTO organs such as review, interpretation 
and concretization are closer to what we refer to as an executive function, having less 
impact on the individual.  
  The capacity of the WTO to adopt legal rules (its quasi legislative 
function) has often been referred to in the doctrine as positive integration.55
 Regarding the possible impact of these rules, COTTIER/OESCH have used 
the notion of a third generation of trade barriers regulation that starts with the 
                                                                                                                                      
qualification requirements and procedures, technical standards and licensing requirements do 
not constitute unnecessary barriers to trade in services. See also: Ministerial Decision on 
Professional Services. 
51Art. XIX para. 3 GATS: the GATS Council shall carry out assessment of trade in services in 
overall terms for the purpose of establishing negotiating guidelines and procedures, as well as 
to establish some procedures for rectification or modification of schedules (para. 5). See also: 
Ministerial Decision on Negotiations on Basic Telecommunications.  
52 Article 18 para. 2 and Annex II of the Agreement on Implementation of Article VII of 
GATT 1994. The Technical Committee examines technical problems, studies practices of the 
Members, and then gives advisory opinion or prepares reports. 
53 Article 4 para. 2 and Annex I of the Agreement on Rules of Origin. 
54 Article 24.3 Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures. It should deliver 
advisory opinions and has a surveillance function (examines notifications; Art. 26). 
55 Comparing to negative integration, which entails negative obligations for states 
(obligations not to raise trade barriers for example), positive integration translates in positive 
obligations as a result of law harmonization. Some authors identify this positive integration as 
part of the regulatory layer of international law-making, noting that “its subject matter tends 
to be more towards what was traditionally considered low politics, in opposition to high 
politics, that have far greater ‘direct’ or ’indirect’ effect on individuals, markets, and come 
more directly into conflict national values”. See: WEILER J.H.H. /MOTOC I. (2003), 
“Taking Democracy Seriously: The Normative Challenges to the International System”, in: 
Griller S. (ed.), International Governance and Non-Economic Concerns. New Challenges for 
the International Legal Order, p. 61 ff. 
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negotiations of the Uruguay Round, and which addresses trade in agriculture, services 
and intellectual property, all of which rely heavily on domestic regulation.56   
 KRAJEWSKI emphasizes that these norms define detailed individual rights 
and public obligations that limit the political choices of national law-makers.57 
As well some authors, by referring to the inappropriateness of the adoption’s 
process of certain WTO decisions (which is no regular on-going legislative process) 
are implicitly pointing to the impact that these decisions have on the individuals. Thus 
MAVROIDIS, arguing that the “WTO strikes down national regulations that protect 
food, safety and the environment”,58 notes that it always acts after the fact and that a 
“body of international administrative law” for the standard setting process has yet to 
be adopted.59 Likewise, COTTIER/OESCH assume that no independent law-making 
body with regulatory powers is formally established within the WTO, and that WTO 
rules are essentially adopted as package deals at the end of negotiations rounds whose 
working procedures and structures are defined by Ministerial Declarations.60 
  At this point, we look at some existing WTO rules to assess the impact 
that WTO decisions can have on individuals. Among other examples, Article 2.2 TBT 
Agreement contains a code of good conduct enumerating legitimate policy objectives, 
thus restricting the policy autonomy of the Members, while Article 2.4 TBT enjoins 
Members to apply international standards, thus invalidating their policy-making 
capacity. 
 In addition, the SPS Agreement prescribes positive action to be taken by 
governments, calling for the harmonization of measures on the basis of existing 
standards (Article 3.3), prescribing modalities of risk assessment (Article 5.1) and risk 
management (Articles 5.5, 5.6 and 5.7).   
 Other examples of rules that have a direct effect on the policy-making of 
Members include the procedural rules of the GATT Agreement regarding publication 
requirements (Article X), customs regulations (Article VIII) and rules of origin 
(Article 9 Agreement on Rules of Origin). 
 Further, the production and consumption of services are subject to domestic 
regulations for which WTO rules provide some disciplines that mostly cover 
transparency requirements and unfair application of rules. In addition, WTO rules 
regulate exceptions that Members may apply to reconcile the objective of trade 
liberalization with other societal values (Articles XX and XXI GATT, Articles XIV 
and XIV bis GATS). 
 Here we should add that, in the case of non-compliance with WTO rules, the 
concrete impact of these rules on individuals will sometimes depend on further 
decision-making at several stages. Besides the adoption of a rule (in other words the 
definition of its substance), which constitutes the first stage, the impact of that rule 
will also depend in a second stage on a ruling by the Dispute Settlement Body 
(DSB).61 Further, this impact might also depend on the consequence of non-
compliance with that ruling (retaliation).62  
                                                
56 COTTIER T./OESCH M. (2005), International Trade Regulation, Staempli; p. 74. 
57 KRAJEWSKI (2001), p. 170. 
58 MAVROIDIS P. C. (2005), The general agreement on tariffs and trade: a commentary, 
Oxford University Press, p. 486. 
59 MAVROIDIS (2005), p. 520. 
60 COTTIER/OESCH (2005), p. 100. 
61 This is relevant in the sense that this step can be a supplementary source of legitimization. 
See: HOWSE R., “Adjudicative Legitimacy and treaty Interpretation in International Trade 
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 In this respect, VON BOGDANDY argues that the WTO causes a diminution 
of the autonomy of States’ policy-making, mostly because it incorporates other 
instruments from outside the WTO into its adjudicative mechanism (intellectual 
property treaties, Codex Alimentarius Commission (CAC), International Office of 
Epizootics (IOE), and the International Plant Protection Convention (IPPC)63, while 
COTTIER / TAKENOSHITA recall that it is mostly the rulings of the Appellate Body 
that become increasingly intrusive, putting democracy at home at risk. These authors 
are therefore distinguishing the issue of rulings from the issue of substantive WTO 
rules and disciplines that result from the political process.64  
Thus we note that applying the material distinction between executive and 
legislative powers to draw up a typology of WTO decisions allows us to identify 
certain decisions that, because of their impact on the individuals, can be considered as 
being of a legislative type. 
 
  
1.1.4.  Comments on legitimacy requirements 
  
 Traditionally, the main legitimacy sources of international law-making have 
been the principles of state’s consent and sovereign equality between states.65 The 
issue of state sovereignty in the WTO seems to be resolved through the consensual 
mode of WTO decision-making according to which, each state that gives powers to 
the WTO has consented to do so.66 In this traditional setting, democracy is not a 
concern.  
 Many authors in discussing the specific nature of WTO powers have shown 
the weakness of this structure and have claimed the existence of a democratic 
deficit,67 while others have denied it.68 Several theories have been developed to 
explain this democratic deficit.  
                                                                                                                                      
Law: The Early Years of WTO Jurisprudence”, in : Weiler J.H.H. (ed.), The EU, the WTO 
and the NAFTA, Towards a Common Law of International Trade? 
62 Some authors have insisted on this point in order to downplay the impact of WTO rules. 
See: ADLUNG R. (2004), “GATS and Democratic Legitimacy”, Aussenwirtschaft, 59, 127-
149. 
63 See VON BOGDANDY (2001), pp. 621-2. 
64 COTTIER / TAKENOSHITA (2003), p. 172. 
65 See WEILER /MOTOC (2003), p. 54. 
66 Some have explicitly stated states’ incentives to transfer some of their powers to the WTO, 
thus downplaying the sovereignty issue. See: Sutherland Report, p. 32, and MESSERLIN P. 
A. (2005), “Three Variations on the Future of the WTO”, 8 JIEL, 299-309, in line somehow 
with the arguments of Petersmann’s theory of WTO constitutionalization (PETERSMANN E. 
-U. (1991), Constitutional Functions and Constitutional Problems of International Economic 
Law, Fribourg University Press. 
67 This view stems from the perspective of average democratic states and does not question a 
supposed universal human right to democratic governance as in FRANCK T. M. (1992), “The 
Emerging Right to Democratic Governance”, 86 AJIL, p. 46. 
68 Opposite opinion: BACCHUS J. (2005), “A Few Thoughts on Legitimacy, Democracy, and 
the WTO”, JIEL 7 (3), 667-673; ADLUNG R. (2004), who spells out conditions that make 
constraints on national policy-making acceptable: relevant areas are clearly specified; 
participation is voluntary and reversible; the governments and legislators concerned are duly 
legitimized to bind their country (p. 134). He argues that the policy constraints of the GATS 
are weak, that they are without bite (p. 136). Speaking of the sanctions, he points out that the 
only consequence for a country that fails to correct a disputed measure or to agree on 
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After coming to the conclusion that WTO law needs to meet national 
democratic constitutional standards, KRAJEWSKI uses the chain of legitimacy 
concept to explain that this standard is far from being effectively applied.69 HOWSE 
refers to the legitimacy gap theory, distinguishing between formal legitimacy that is 
met pursuant to the standards of international law, and social legitimacy that is not 
met in the WTO context;70 he also refers to the agency cost theory to explain why 
democratic features of WTO decision-making are insufficient.71 
 In the following sections, we analyse the procedural modes and the 
composition of the organs of WTO decision-making, and then take a look at some 
reform proposals that have been made regarding their design with a view to improve 
the legitimacy and efficiency of the process. 
 
  
1.2.  Procedural modes of decision-making 
  
1.2.1.  The legal rules 
  
The WTO Agreement contains several provisions on procedural modes of decision-
making. 
 First, Article IX provides that “the WTO shall continue the practice of 
decision-making by consensus followed under GATT 1947. Except as otherwise 
provided, where a decision cannot be arrived at by consensus, the matter at issue 
shall be decided by voting”, stating further than each Member of the WTO shall have 
one vote. Thus, the WTO Agreement formally recognizes the practice of decision-
making by consensus, prescribing voting as a subsidiary means. Some decisions must 
be taken by consensus according to the WTO Agreement (mandated consensus).72 In 
addition, WTO Members took several decisions prescribing that certain decisions 
would be taken by consensus instead of voting (consensus in lieu of voting).73 
 Some other provisions about decision-making procedures can be found in the 
Rules of Procedure of each body,74 as well as in some WTO Multilateral Agreements 
and their Annexes.75  
                                                                                                                                      
compensation would be the suspension of a concession, and that there is no possibility for a 
WTO body to override national policy decisions and to intervene directly (p. 138). 
69 See KRAJEWSKI (2001). 
70 See: HOWSE (2000), pp. 36-7; also: WEILER J.H.H. (1999), “The transformation of 
Europe”, in: The Constitution of Europe, “Do the New Clothes have an Emperor?” and other 
Essays on European Integration, Cambridge University Press.   
71 See: HOWSE R. (2003), “How to Begin to Think About the ‘Democratic Deficit’ at the 
WTO”, in : Griller S. (ed.), International Governance and Non-Economic Concerns. New 
Challenges for the International Legal Order. 
72 These are the decisions of the DSB (reverse consensus: note 3 to Article IX :3 and Article 
2.4 DSU), as well as the decisions of the Ministerial Conference to waive an obligation 
subject to a transition period (note 4 to Article IX : 3 WTO Agreement), to amend Annex 2 of 
the DSU (Article X :8 WTO Agreement), or to add a Plurilateral Trade Agreement (Article 
X : 9 WTO Agreement). 
73 These are the decisions on waivers (Article IX :3 WTO Agreement) and decisions on 
accessions (Article XII: 2 WTO Agreement). 
74 The Rules of Procedure for Sessions of the Ministerial Conference and Meetings of the 
General Council (WT/L/161, adopted 25 July 1996) serve as a template for the Rules of 
Procedures of most bodies. 
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 A common feature of the Rules of Procedure of the various organs is Article 
33 which states that a decision that cannot be reached by consensus in a lower organ 
should be referred to the higher body.  
  
1.2.2.  Comments on the formal rules 
  
We observe that some rules of the WTO agreements reflect the principle that different 
legitimacy requirements shall be fulfilled depending on the type of decision to be 
adopted, thus expressing the idea of a varying legitimization requirement.  
 For instance, Article X WTO Agreement provides for different majority 
requirements, depending on the type of amendment to be adopted.76 Generally, we 
observe that some decisions, like authoritative interpretations and waivers, only 
require the formal acceptance of the WTO representatives of a certain majority of 
Members, while others, like the decisions amending the treaties, must be submitted to 
the Members for acceptance, which means they need to be ratified by their 
constituencies. Further, amendments that do not alter the rights and obligations of the 
Members can be imposed on Members that have not accepted them. 
 By means of these distinctions, we can identify different types of decisions 
taken by the Ministerial Conference and General Council. 
 We could consider the decisions amending the articles mentioned in Paragraph 
6 as being of a constitutional type, while the decisions on amendments that alter the 
rights and obligations of Members could be seen as being of a legislative type, and 
those that do not alter the rights and obligations of Members as being of a “soft” 
legislative type. Finally, decisions on authoritative interpretations and waivers could 
be seen as being more executive in nature. 
 A second type of WTO procedural rules that reflect legitimacy concerns is 
Rule 33 of the Rules of Procedure of most bodies. By prescribing that a decision that 
                                                                                                                                      
75 For instance, Annex II of the Agreement on the Implementation of Article VII GATT 
(Technical Committee on Customs Valuations) contains detailed dispositions on the dates of 
the sessions, the setting of the agenda, the powers of the Chairman, quorum and voting, 
languages and records. 
76 As a general principle, paragraph 4 of Article X states that amendments shall take effect for 
all Members upon acceptance by two-thirds of them. However, the amendment of certain 
clauses requires specific treatment. According to Paragraph 3, amendments that would alter 
the rights and obligations of the Members take effect only for the Members that have 
accepted them (in such cases the Ministerial Conference may decide by a three-fourths 
majority if the Members that have not accepted the amendments are free to withdraw from the 
Organization or if they can remain a Member).  
Pursuant to Paragraph 2, five provisions require the acceptance of all Members to be 
amended: these are Article X of the WTO Agreement itself (provisions on amendments), 
Article IX WTO Agreement (rules on decision-making), Articles I and II GATT (Most-
Favoured-Nation Treatment and Schedules of Concessions), Article II: 1 GATS (Most-
Favoured-Nation Treatment) and Article 4 TRIPS (Most-Favoured-Nation Treatment). 
Article X: 6, by reference to Article 71:2 TRIPS, applies to amendments to multilateral 
agreements outside the WTO serving the purpose of adjusting to higher levels of protection of 
intellectual property rights and provides that such amendments may be adopted by the 
Minsterial Conference, on the basis of a consensual proposal of the TRIPS Council, without 
further acceptance process if these amendments are achieved, in force and accepted by all 
WTO Members under those agreements. Finally, Article XII WTO Agreement states that the 
Ministerial Conference shall approve the agreement on the terms of accession by a two-third 
majority of the Members. 
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cannot be reached by consensus in a lower organ should be referred to the higher 
organ, this rule assumes on the one hand that when a consensus is reached, the 
decision is deemed legitimated even if it is adopted in a lower organ;77 whereas on the 
other hand, it assumes that higher organs are endowed with higher legitimacy since 
the step towards other modes of decision-making (voting) may occur only at this 
level. In the next section, we try to explain how this can be justified, by analysing the 
composition of WTO organs. 
  
1.2.3.  In practice 
  
In practice, voting in the WTO never takes place. COTTIER/TAKENOSHITA 
believe that “the main reason for avoiding voting lies in the fact that the principle of 
one member one vote does not reflect economic interests and real powers within the 
multilateral trading system”; these authors then show the imbalance and material 
inequality of representation between Members that exist in terms of voting rights with 
respect to their shares of financial contributions to the WTO, gross domestic products 
(GDP) and voting rates.78 We will return later to the consequences that consensus 
decision-making has on legitimacy with respect to the balance of power within the 
organization.  
 What we want to address here are the informal practices that lead to the formal 
adoption of a decision by consensus in one of the WTO bodies. We will distinguish 
between consensus as the formal means of adopting a decision and consensus as the 
process of reaching that decision. The former consists of a “non-objection” and is 
referred to as “passive consensus”, while the latter is referred to as “active 
consensus”.79  
 Active consensus (or consensus-building) transforms the decision-making 
process into a negotiating process that aims at reaching a bargain made of mutual 
concessions, which are often of a “crossing” character as a consequence of the single 
undertaking principle.80   
 Some of these informal consultations potentially involve the entire 
membership, for example, the meetings of the Heads of Delegations (attended by 
senior diplomats or specialists coming from capitals), although smaller groups are 
sometimes convened.  
                                                
77 KUIJPER who supports this view, considers that this creates “ a certain tension between 
efficiency and legitimacy” (p. 109). The question that arises here is whether a decision 
reached by consensus by the lower body is definitive (p. 86). See: KUIJPER P. J. (2002), 
“Some institutional issues presently before the WTO”, in: Kennedy D.L.M./ Southwick J.D. 
(eds.), The Political Economy of International Trade Law: essays in honor of Robert E. 
Hudec, Cambridge University Press. 
78 COTTIER/TAKENOSHITA (2003), p. 179; further argue that “current voting rules in 
WTO fail to respond to the requirement that majority voting procedures need to be able to 
assure that major trading partners in the system keep an interest in dealing with each other 
on the basis of the WTO law”, with the risk that they will leave the system. 
79 See FOOTER (2005), p. 138. 
80 The single undertaking principle implies that the whole result of a negotiation will be 
adopted by the entire membership, in other words that a Member cannot pick those parts of 
the bargain that are acceptable and leave others aside. Crossing concessions means that a 
package deal can cover different issue-areas (for example, concessions in the field of service 
are balanced with concessions in the agriculture field). 
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 This smaller group feature is a response to the principle of efficiency since a 
technique is required to reconcile the diverging views of a broad membership,81 which 
BLACKHURST has well described as a “concentric circles model”.  
 This model includes the well known “green room meetings” where the most 
powerful countries participate first. These meetings can be held during the Ministerial 
Conferences or they can take place in Geneva at the ambassadorial level.  
 Linked to such meetings is the phenomenon of alliance building, which may 
consist of geographical groupings (economic integration)82 or interests groupings,83 
and which allow countries to increase their bargaining power and get specific items 
onto the agenda. 
  
1.2.4.  Comments on the practice of WTO decision-making 
  
In this section, we consider the effects of consensual decision-making in the WTO on 
legitimacy issues. Here we must distinguish between the international law perspective 
that takes into account the state sovereignty issue, and the democratic perspective. 
Differing views are expressed on the issue of state sovereignty. Some authors 
argue that consensus amounts to giving each member a right of veto and that this is 
consistent with the principle of equal sovereignty of states, therefore enhancing the 
legitimacy of decisions.84 This increase of legitimacy will translate into a better 
implementation of WTO rules since no Member will have to implement a decision 
against its will. 
 On the other hand, some argue that this equality between states is only formal 
and that consensus in fact reflects the underlying power relationships between 
Members, taking the form of an implicit weighted voting system pursuant to the 
major interests’ norm;85 some refer to the varying “consensus-resistance” capacity of 
states.86 
 For FOOTER,87 “consensus decision-making for all its flaws sustains the 
delicate balance between equality of voting power and parity of (economic) interest 
among the Members”. Furthermore, some claim that consensus corresponds to the 
very nature of WTO obligations, which as a consequence of the single undertaking 
principle are contractual, meaning that they must be mutually beneficial and agreed 
on both sides. 
                                                
81 This feature can lead to the marginalization of a number of countries, notably developing 
countries, and can collide with the principle of inclusiveness. This point is linked to the 
“internal transparency debate” (or “effective participation”). See: VAN DEN BOSSCHE 
(2005), The Law and Policy of the World Trade Organization, Cambridge University Press. p. 
151. 
82 e.g. the EU or, less formally, the ASEAN. 
83 e.g. the Cairns group interested in the liberalization of agricultural trade, the Group of 10 
defending more protectionist position on agriculture, the ACP Group (Caribbean and Pacific) 
or the LDC Group (Least-Developed Members).  
84 See: VAN DEN BOSSCHE (2005), 148. 
85 See: FOOTER (2005), p. 106. 
86 See: EHLERMANN C.-D./EHRING L. (2005), “Are WTO Decision-Making Procedures 
Adequate for Making, Revising, and Implementing Worldwide and Plurilateral Rules?”, in: 
Reforming the World Trading System : Legitimacy, Efficiency, and Global Governance, 
edited by Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Oxford University Press. 
87 FOOTER (2005), p. 162. 
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 Second, consensus decision-making may have an impact on democratic 
legitimacy. Many authors have been calling for reforms that would enhance the 
efficiency of the WTO political branch to counter an eventual legal activism of the 
WTO judiciary branch that occurs without any legitimacy check. These reform 
proposals are addressed in a subsequent section of this article.   
 Further, one important feature of the consensus practice is the reinforced role 
of the chairperson of meetings, who structures discussions and decides whether 
certain issues will be discussed separately and how to resolve deadlocks.88 Because of 
this broad influence, it is recognized that there should be some parity in the 
nomination of chairpersons; also, some of their formal functions are set up in the 
Rules of Procedure of several bodies. 
 Finally, since the process of consensus-building takes place outside formal 
meetings of WTO organs, it can allow a wider range of actors to participate, including 
non-state actors or non-member countries. 
 
  
1.3.  The organ of decision-making 
 
Again, we shall distinguish here whether we assess the composition of WTO bodies 
from the perspective of state sovereignty (international law conception of legitimacy) 
or from the perspective of democratic legitimacy. 
 From the perspective of state sovereignty (membership’s representation), the 
rule is that all bodies of the WTO are bodies of the whole.89 There are, however, some 
formal exceptions.  
 First there can be bodies of limited composition drawn from the membership, 
such as the former Textiles Monitoring Body.90 Second, some bodies of limited 
composition are made up of experts from outside the organization who are chosen by 
the Members, such as the Permanent Group of Experts (PGE) under the SCM 
Agreement.91 
 Notably, the WTO has not established a body of limited composition that 
would exercise some kind of executive function, as was the case for a limited time 
during the GATT era with the Consultative Group of Eighteen.92  
 Here it is important to consider how these formal rules perform in practice. 
First, it should be noted that many countries do not have the capacity to send 
                                                
88 On the role of the chair, see ODELL J. S. (2005), “Chairing a WTO Negotiation”, JIEL (2), 
425-448; KRAJEWSKI M. (2000), Verfassungsperspektiven und Legitimation des Rechts der 
Welthandelsorganisation (WTO), Duncker & Humbolt, p. 84; and FOOTER (2005), p. 170. 
89 See for instance Art. IV WTO Agreement, Art. 13 Agreement on Safeguards, Art. 24.1 
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures. 
90 Established by Art. 8 of the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (ACT), its mandate was to 
monitor the implementation of the ACT. It was dismantled since the ACT is no longer in 
force. 
91 See Art. 24.2 SCM Agreement: the PGE consists of five highly qualified independent 
specialists in the field of subsidies and trade relations, who may at the request of the SCM 
give an advisory opinion on the existence and nature of a subsidy. 
92 The Consultative Group of Eighteen was established by a decision of the Council of 11 July 
1975. Some authors have recently proposed the introduction of such a body (See: Sutherland 
Report, 70-71, para. 323-327). 
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representatives attend every meeting;93 in combination with Rule 33 of the Rule of 
Procedures referred to above, this can have serious consequences on the equal 
sovereignty of states principle as we explained earlier that decisions adopted by 
consensus in lower bodies may be definitive.94 
 We note also that the informal practices leading to the adoption of decisions 
involve the emergence of groups of limited composition that are sometimes self-
elected, thus excluding some countries from participation.95 
 From the democratic legitimacy perspective, the composition of the Members’ 
delegations must be scrutinized with respect to representation of national 
constituencies. In this respect, we observe that the Ministerial Conference is 
composed of the ministers from the Member countries, whereas the General Council 
gathers higher-level ambassadors and the lower bodies representatives of the states 
who may be technical experts.96 Further, the practice of rule-referencing means that 
the composition of bodies outside the WTO should also be scrutinized.97 
 We note that the logic lying behind Rule 33 of the Rules of Procedure as well 
as the broad powers given by the agreements to the Ministerial Conference and 
General Council suppose that these organs are capable of conferring higher legitimacy 
than lower bodies to the decisions they adopt. This is relevant with respect to the 
reform proposals that follow. 
 
 
2.   Reform proposals - Conclusion 
 
 
Using as a framework the approach consisting in distinguishing the three parameters 
of decision-making, we consider in the following various reform proposals put 
forward by some authors to enhance either the legitimacy or the efficiency of WTO 
decision-making; we also explain how both issues are closely intertwined.  
Regarding the procedural mode of decision-making, most reform proposals 
aim first at improving efficiency. Some authors propose to give up consensus and 
replace it with a weighted voting system.98, while others suggest some “fine tuning” 
of the consensual mode. From this latter perspective, the idea of a “critical mass” 
would imply that a Member should refrain from blocking a decision which is 
supported by a significant amount of countries99; as well, another proposal prescribes 
that a Member who is blocking a decision that otherwise enjoys broad support would 
                                                
93 See BLACKHURST R. (2001), "Reforming WTO Decision Making: Lessons from 
Singapore and Seattle", in: Deutsch K./Speyer B. (eds.), The World Trade Organization 
Millennium Round: Freer Trade in the Twenty-First Century, Routledge. 
94 In principle, lower bodies cannot adopt binding decisions. However, some controversial 
instances have shown that they sometimes do. See: KUIJPER (2002). 
95 This is referred to as the issue of “internal transparency”. 
96 For a detailed analysis of the composition of delegations, see KRAJEWSKI M. (2000), 
Verfassungsperspektiven und Legitimation des Rechts der Welthandelsorganisation (WTO), 
pp. 88 ff.   
97 In this respect, VON BOGDANDY has looked at the operative level of the Codex 
Alimentarius Commission (CAC) and its rule-making practice. He points out the various 
instruments, procedures and membership that are largely tailored to fit with private interests, 
and therefore undemocratic. See: VON BOGDANDY (2001), pp. 633 f. 
98 See: COTTIER/TAKENOSHITA (2003). 
99 See: JACKSON (2001), p. 74 
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have to declare in writing that the matter on which the decision is being taken is of 
vital interest to it.100  
Moreover, some authors have suggested departing from the single undertaking 
principle in order to enhance efficiency,101 while others have also argued that the way 
powers are distributed within the hierarchical structure of the organization bodies can 
have an impact on efficiency.102 
Concerning the impact of these proposals on legitimacy, we note that 
enhancing efficiency can on the one hand simultaneously enhance legitimacy; this is 
the case regarding the balance of powers’ issue. In this context, enhancing the 
efficiency of the WTO political branch would allow some legitimacy check to be 
made on the judiciary branch’s output.    
 On the other hand, efficiency and legitimacy can sometimes collide. 
When enhancing efficiency implies formally departing from the consensus mode of 
decision-making, it has a negative impact on legitimacy from the perspective of the 
sovereign equality of states. In this respect, we have seen however that even the 
consensus mode of decision-making in its present design, with all the informal 
practices it entails, does not promote legitimacy in that sense; that form of legitimacy 
could be enhanced by formalizing the practices of consensus decision-making and 
increasing its transparency, as advocated in several reform proposals. 
 In addition, proposals that aim at rationalizing the work of the WTO by 
distributing powers more optimally to the lower organs can have a negative impact on 
both forms of legitimacy (in the sense of the sovereign equality of states and in the 
sense of democratic legitimacy) since lower bodies are often neither representative of 
the membership of the organization nor of the national constituencies of the members.  
Here, a balance must be found.103 
Regarding the composition of WTO organs, some authors have suggested the 
creation of a limited-size subgroup of members that would steer the WTO political 
process based on the model of the Consultative Group of Eighteen under the GATT, 
therefore enhancing efficiency. This group would be established on a transparent, 
predictable, equitable, as well as legitimate basis in the eyes of all Members, 
formalizing in some way the actual decision-making practices. It would be composed 
of self-selected groups of countries that would help to compensate for the shortage of 
resources in some least-developed countries.104 
 Another proposal is to reinforce the involvement of high-ranking 
political leaders to give greater impulse to the process.105 To some, greater 
involvement of political leaders would also enhance the democratic legitimacy of 
                                                
100See: Sutherland Report, 64, paras. 287 and 289. 
101 See HOWSE (2003). 
102 Generally, it appears that, in the proceedings of international organizations, States will be 
less likely to object to decisions taken in lower organs when these decisions require the 
subsequent approval of a higher organ before they become final. See: SCHERMERS H. G./ 
BLOKKER N. M. (2003), International Institutional Law, Nijhoff, p. 472. 
103 See: KUIJPER (2002). 
104 BLACKHURST R., HARTRIDGE D. (2005), “Improving the Capacity of WTO 
Institutions to Fulfill their Mandate”, in : Petersmann E.-U. (ed.), Reforming the World 
Trading System : Legitimacy, Efficiency, and Global Governance, and Sutherland Report, 
chapter 8.     
105 See: Sutherland Report, chapter 8.  
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decision-making;106 we note that this is pursuant to the logic of the WTO institutional 
structure that we have discussed above. 
 Regarding democratic legitimacy, proposals have been made to 
involve to a greater extent national parliaments and non-state actors at the WTO 
level.107 We argue that the participation of non-state actors should be regulated and 
that mechanisms should be established to increase its transparency.108 
 At the national level, HOWSE advocates extraordinary mechanisms of 
democratic consent, such as plebiscites on results of the Doha round, with strict 
campaign rules. Further, he suggests ending the use of package deals, in order to 
prevent take it or leave it situations that weaken national procedures of legitimization, 
and to work to create some kind of “ownership” of the results.109  
Finally, some authors have put the focus on the object of decision-making and 
have suggested not increasing the powers given to the WTO, thus recognizing that the 
scope of reform on the two other components of decision-making is limited. 
 After noting that since the very conditions of democracy (deliberation 
and rational discourse) are not met in the WTO, KRAJEWSKI argues that one 
solution is either to increase the supply of or decrease the demand for legitimacy. 
Assuming that the first solution is not feasible, he suggests limiting the WTO mandate 
and agenda, which would mean refraining from regulating on issues of environmental 
protection, labour standards, investment protection or competition rules.110 In line 
with this proposal, HOWE/NICOLAÏDIS advocate the practice of institutional 
sensitivity.111 
 Furthermore, in order to remedy what he calls the missing legislator, 
VON BOGDANDY (pp. 651 f.) is pushing the coordinate independence model, 
which gives high priority to the regulatory autonomy of WTO Members and focuses 
substantive WTO law solely on concretizing the principle of non-discrimination.112 
As to HOWSE, he suggests making more room for reversibility in service 
commitment (opt-outs and safeguards),113  
                                                
106 In this respect, see the proposal of candidate for French presidency Sarkozy, in “Nicolas 
Sarkozy veut changer les règles de l'OMC”, in: Le Monde, 9.03.2007. 
107 On the involvement of national parliaments, see the series of articles in: PETERSMANN 
E.-U. (ed.), Reforming the World Trading System: Legitimacy, Efficiency, and Global 
Governance. On the participation of non-state actors: CHARNOWITZ S. (2000), “Opening 
the WTO to non-governmental interests”, 24 Fordham Int’l L. J. 173, and ESTY D. C. 
(1998), “Non-Governmental Organizations at the World Trade Organization: Cooperation, 
Competition, or Exclusion”, JIEL 1, 123-147. 
108 On rules for the participation of non-state actors in the WTO, issues of external 
transparency and de-restriction of official WTO documents, see VAN DEN BOSSCHE 
(2005). 
109 See: HOWSE (2003). 
110 See: KRAJEWSKI (2001), pp. 171 f. 
111 See: HOWSE/NICOLAÏDIS (2001). Institutional sensitivity would imply taking into 
account the superior credentials of other institutions to address values trade-off entailed in 
domestic measures, thus placing WTO law in the general framework of public international 
law. 
112 See: VON BOGDANDY (2001), pp. 651 f.: under this model, the impact of the measures 
of other states is emphasized; this implies that in situations of procedural vagueness, WTO 
provisions are to be interpreted in a procedural way that would force states to take account of 
the legitimate foreign interests in their policy-making, which otherwise have no standing in 
the domestic political and legal processes. 
113 See: HOWSE (2003). 
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 In an original way, PAUWELYN links reforms on both the procedure 
and the object of decision-making. He perceives consensus decision-making as a kind 
of participation and political input that is part of voice mechanisms; he argues that 
these voice mechanisms should be reinforced in order to maintain equilibrium with 
the WTO’s high levels of legalization and discipline. In his view, the legitimacy 
problem of the trading system is best resolved by means of reforms on both sides of 
what he calls law (judiciary branch) and politics (political branch). Reforms on the 
law side imply providing some limited exit options to the Members as well as lower 
discipline; further, the judiciary branch needs to be politically sensitive, sufficient 
membership control must be maintained, and quality checks on the personnel active in 
dispute settlement must be increased. Reforms on the politics side imply giving up the 
single undertaking principle.114  
 
To conclude this analysis, we want to recall that one of the main challenges of 
WTO reforms is applying the very concept of democratic legitimacy at the 
international level. We leave the reader with some thoughts from WEILER/MOTOC 
who suggest “repacking [democracy] as part of a broader discourse of legitimacy”, 
recalling that legitimacy encompasses elements other than democracy. They argue 
that “the issue is how in the face of international community which appropriate and 
defines common material and spiritual assets and in the face of international 
government which increasingly appropriate administrative functions of the state, we 
can establish mechanisms which, in the vocabulary of normative political theory, 
would legitimize such governance”.115 They further suggest “rethinking the very 
building blocks of democracy to see how these may or may not be employed in the 
international system and to search for alternative legitimating devices which would 
make up for the non-application of some of the classical institutions of democracy 
where that is not possible”.116 
 
                                                
114 See: PAUWELYN J. (2005), “The Sutherland Report: A Missed Opportunity for Genuine 
Debate on Trade, Globalization and Reforming the WTO”, 8 JIEL, 329-346. Also: 
PAUWELYN J. (2005), “The transformation of World Trade”, Duke Law Legal Studies 
Research Paper Series, No. 66. 
115 See: WEILER/MOTOC (2003), pp. 62 ff. and 70. 
116 On other sources of legitimacy, see: See HOWSE R. (2001), “The Legitimacy of the 
WTO”, in: Coicaud J.-M. /Heiskanen V. (eds.), The Legitimacy of International 
Organizations; MORAVCSIK A. (2004), “Is there a ‘Democratic Deficit’ in World Politics? 
A framework for analysis”.  Governement and Opposition 39 :2, pp. 336-363. 
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